Genetically Engineered Crops, It’s What’s for Dinner: Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms by Guregian, Noreen
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
3-1-2011
Genetically Engineered Crops, It’s What’s for
Dinner: Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms
Noreen Guregian
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Noreen Guregian, Genetically Engineered Crops, It’s What’s for Dinner: Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1249
(2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol44/iss3/17
  
 
1249 
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS, 
IT’S WHAT’S FOR DINNER: 
MONSANTO CO. V. GEERTSON SEED FARMS 
Noreen Guregian* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the dawn of agriculture, humans have grown different 
varieties of the same crops while still maintaining varietal purity. A 
stroll down the aisles of any supermarket in America illustrates that 
today’s farmers can grow an array of distinct crop varieties despite 
the potential for cross-pollination1 among different crops. Farmers 
successfully grow sweet corn despite its ability to cross-pollinate 
with field corn and popcorn, and green cabbage despite its 
compatibility with red cabbage as well as varieties of onions, 
radishes, and beets. 
Alfalfa is the fourth most widely grown crop in the United 
States and is grown on over twenty million acres of land.2 A member 
of the legume family, alfalfa is an important crop for livestock feed 
and for commercial seed production.3 In recent decades, genetically 
 
 * J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.S., Business Administration, 2008, 
University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business. I would like to extend thanks to 
Elena DeCoste Grieco, for her guidance, support, and encouragement. I would also like to thank 
the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their work on this Comment. Most importantly, I want 
to thank my parents, who never let me forget the importance of hard work and a great education. 
 1. Pollination is the process by which pollen is transferred in plants, thereby enabling 
fertilization and sexual reproduction. Cross-pollination occurs when pollen is delivered to a 
flower from a different plant. Pollination, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/467948/pollination# (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
 2. Brief of American Farm Bureau Federation et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 14, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010) (No. 09–475) 
[hereinafter Brief of American Farm Bureau]. Alfalfa—known as the “Queen of the Forages”—is 
one of the oldest cultivated plants in recorded history and is today the most cultivated legume in 
the world. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SEEDS, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND USES 8 (Michael Black 
et al. eds., 2006). 
 3. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (No. 09–475). 
Ninety-nine percent of alfalfa is grown to produce hay, which is used primarily as feed for 
livestock. Id. 
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engineered (GE) alfalfa has become a mainstay of American 
agriculture because of its enormous benefits, including higher yields, 
resistance to diseases and insects, compatibility with low-toxicity 
pesticides, and minimal farm-operating costs, as well as increased 
farm income.4 The concern of some alfalfa farmers—both 
conventional and organic growers—is that open pollination5 makes 
plants susceptible to pollination by  nearby GE alfalfa plants. 
In Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,6 respondent Geertson 
Seed Farms (“Geertson”) unsuccessfully challenged, under the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), the federal 
government’s approval procedures for the planting and sale of a GE 
alfalfa variety known as Roundup Ready Alfalfa (RRA).7 Before the 
district court’s judgment, farmers had planted RRA for twenty-one 
months without any judicially or legislatively imposed restrictions.8 
The Monsanto decision also affects injunctions in a novel way. It 
significantly increases the burden on plaintiffs when they seek 
injunctive relief and sets in stone the “traditional” four-part 
injunctive relief test briefly thought to apply only to patent cases. 
This Comment evaluates the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Monsanto, in which the Court deemed that it was 
excessive to partially deregulate and prohibit altered-alfalfa planting 
pending completion of a detailed environmental review.9 Part II 
discusses the procedural history and facts. Part III examines the 
Supreme Court’s decision to overturn the injunction preventing 
Geertson from planting a GE alfalfa crop. Part IV provides a brief 
synopsis of the regulatory structure of GE agriculture and explores 
recent cases concerning GE agriculture. Part V critiques the Supreme 
Court’s decision with regards to GE agricultural developments and 
 
 4. See Brief of American Farm Bureau, supra note 2, at 17–19. As of 2010, farmers had 
planted GE varieties on 93 percent of soybean, 86 percent of corn, and 93 percent of cotton acres 
grown in the United States. Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops in the U.S.: Extent of 
Adoption, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV. (July 1, 2010), 
http://ers.usda.gov/Data/BiotechCrops/adoption.htm. 
 5. Open pollination typically occurs from plants grown to produce commercial seed that 
must be allowed to bloom. Monsanto v. Geerston Seed Farms: The Supreme Court Alfalfa 
Decision, COOKING UP STORY (June 28, 2010), http://cookingupastory.com/Monsanto-v-
geerston-seed-farms-the-supreme-court-alfalfa-decision. 
 6. 130 S. Ct. 2743. 
 7. Id. at 2746. 
 8. Id. at 2751. 
 9. Id. at 2761–62. 
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injunctions. Lastly, Part VI considers the potential significance of 
this case as to both the standards for injunctive relief and on future 
developments in GE agriculture. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Under a provision of the Plant Protection Act,10 the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture has authority “to prevent the introduction 
of plant pests into the United States.”11 The Department of 
Agriculture has delegated rule-making power under this provision to 
one of its divisions, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS).12 APHIS’s regulations presume that GE plants are pests 
unless it determines otherwise.13 This decision is made in compliance 
with NEPA, which requires federal agencies to prepare an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) to the fullest extent possible14 
unless the agency produces an environmental assessment 
determining that the deregulation will not have a “significant impact 
on the environment.”15 An environmental assessment provides 
information concerning “the context and intensity of effects that may 
‘significantly’ affect the quality of the human environment” and 
considers ways to alter the action to reduce such effects.16 
Monsanto owns the intellectual property rights to RRA, a GE 
alfalfa crop.17 APHIS initially classified RRA as a regulated crop,18 
 
 10. The Plant Protection Act became law in June 2000 as part of the Agricultural Risk 
Protection Act and consolidates all or part of 10 existing USDA plant health laws into one 
comprehensive law, including the authority to regulate plants, plant products, and plant pests. The 
Plant Protection Act: Plant Protection and Quarantine, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ANIMAL & PLANT 
HEALTH INSPECTION SERV. (June 2002), 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/fsheet_faq_notice/fs_ phproact.html. 
 11. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2749 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 7711(a) (2006)). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. The EIS is a NEPA compliance document used to evaluate a range of alternatives when 
solving whether the problem would have a significant effect on the human environment. National 
Environmental Policy Act: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Jan. 2, 
2009), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/faqs/nepa/index.html. The EIS is a formal 
analysis process which mandates public comment periods that covers purpose and need, 
alternatives, existing conditions, environmental consequences, and consultation and coordination. 
Id. 
 15. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2750. 
 16. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A CITIZENS GUIDE TO 
THE NEPA: HAVING YOUR VOICE HEARD 12 (2007), available at 
http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/NEPA/Citizens_Guide_Dec07.pdf. 
 17. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 570 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2009) rev’d sub nom. 
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but in 2004, Monsanto sought nonregulated status for RRA.19 In 
response, APHIS prepared a draft environmental assessment, and 
after considering hundreds of public comments, APHIS issued a 
“Finding of No Significant Impact and decided to deregulate RRA 
unconditionally and without preparing an EIS.”20 Geertson filed suit, 
alleging NEPA and Plant Protection Act violations.21 The district 
court agreed with APHIS’s determination that RRA does not have 
any harmful health effects on humans or livestock22 but held that 
APHIS violated NEPA by deregulating RRA without first preparing 
an EIS.23 More specifically, APHIS’s environmental assessment 
failed to answer questions concerning the extent to which complete 
deregulation would lead to the contamination of organic alfalfa and 
the extent to which introducing RRA would contribute to the 
development of Roundup-resistant weeds.24 The district court 
subsequently (1) vacated APHIS’s deregulation decision, (2) ordered 
the agency to prepare an EIS before it ruled on Monsanto’s 
deregulation petition, and (3) enjoined virtually all planting of RRA 
until the agency could finish the EIS.25 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.26 The Ninth Circuit panel found that the district court had 
not committed clear error in making any of its ancillary factual 
findings and had “not abuse[d] its discretion in choosing to reject 
APHIS’s proposed mitigation measures in favor of a broader 
injunction to prevent more irreparable harm from occurring.”27 
 
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Farms Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010). RRA is engineered to be tolerant 
of glyphosate, the active ingredient of the herbicide Roundup. Id. 
 18. Regulated pests are frequently intercepted from imported commodities at U.S. ports of 
entry, and regulated pests identified by APHIS or stakeholders are indicated as having the 
potential to cause serious economic or environmental damage in the United States. 7 C.F.R. 
§§ 300–99 (2010). 
 19. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2750. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 2750–51. 
 22. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 4. 
 23. Geertson Farms Inc. v. Johanns, No. C-06-01075-CRB, 2007 WL 1302981, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007), aff’d, 570 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Farms 
Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at *9. 
 26. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 570 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. 
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Farms Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010). 
 27. Id. at 1139. 
  
Spring 2011]     MONSANTO CO. V. GEERTSON SEED FARMS 1253 
Monsanto petitioned the Supreme Court for review. The appeal 
raised two central questions. The first issue was whether the 
conventional alfalfa farmers were the proper parties to sue—whether 
they had standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.28 The 
second issue, and the focus of this Comment, was a technical 
question about the scope of the district court’s injunction preventing 
the government from granting Monsanto’s petition to deregulate its 
alfalfa seeds.29 The Supreme Court held that the district court had 
issued an overly broad injunction.30 Furthermore, the injunction 
prevented the government from granting a petition without preparing 
a full environmental impact statement, not only for complete 
deregulation, but also for partial deregulation of conventional alfalfa 
crops.31 
III.  BACKGROUND 
A.  NEPA Procedural Requirements 
Congress created NEPA over forty years ago as part of a policy 
to promote the quality of the U.S. environment.32 Still relevant today, 
the Act was originally designed to proclaim a national policy that 
will “encourage productive . . . harmony between man and his 
environment; promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate 
damage to the environment . . . and stimulate the health and welfare 
of man; [and] enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and 
natural resources important to the Nation . . . .”33 The Act applies to 
every federal agency and requires them to make informed decisions 
by first determining whether proposed actions will significantly 
impact the environment.34 NEPA does not mandate particular results; 
rather, “it imposes only procedural requirements on federal agencies 
with a particular focus on requiring agencies to undertake analyses of 
 
 28. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2752–53 (2010). 
 29. Ann Carlson, U.S. Supreme Court Issues Decision in Monsanto Case, LEGAL PLANET: 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y BLOG (June 21, 2010), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2010/06/21/u-s-
supreme-court-issues-decision-in-monsanto-case/. 
 30. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2761. 
 31. Id. at 2759. 
 32. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 16, at 2. 
 33. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006). 
 34. See id.; Allison M. Straka, Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns: Why Alfalfa Is Not the Only 
Little Rascal for Bio-Agriculture Law, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 383, 388 (2010). 
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the environmental impact of their proposals and actions.”35 
The threshold question in evaluating a NEPA violation is for the 
agency to determine whether the action is likely to have significant 
environmental effects.36 If the agency concludes that there are “no 
likely significant effects on the environment, the agency establishes a 
categorical exclusion” and allows for deregulation of the crop.37 
Further, the proposed action is permissible as long as no 
“extraordinary circumstances” exist that may cause the action to 
negatively impact the environment.38 
Conversely, if the agency determines the proposed action will 
have a significant impact on the environment, NEPA requires it to 
prepare an EIS.39 The EIS dictates more extensive regulatory 
requirements:40 NEPA mandates that the agency “must identify all of 
the environmental issues involved and make recommendations about 
the action,” while simultaneously receiving public feedback.41 
Following the EIS findings and public comment period, the agency 
then decides whether to implement the proposed action.42 If, 
however, the agency cannot determine if the action will affect the 
environment, it must prepare an environmental assessment that 
evaluates the effect on the human environment and contemplates 
options to reduce such effects.43 If the agency finds an absence of 
significant environmental effects following the public feedback 
period, it establishes a Finding of No Significant Impact and makes a 
decision about the action.44 
Before the Monsanto decision, APHIS found no significant 
impact after conducting its environmental assessment, which led to 
the deregulation of RRA and subsequent litigation.45 APHIS’s 
determinations indicate that the NEPA process provides agencies 
 
 35. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756–57 (citing Robertson v. Methow 
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349–50 (1989)). 
 36. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 16, at 8–9; Straka, supra note 34, at 389. 
 37. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 16, at 10. 
 38. Id. at 11. 
 39. Straka, supra note 34, at 389. 
 40. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 16, at 13. 
 41. Straka, supra note 34, at 389. 
 42. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 16, at 18. 
 43. Id. at 12; Straka, supra note 34, at 389. 
 44. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 16, at 12. 
 45. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2750 (2010). 
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with a tremendous amount of discretion when determining their 
actions’ environmental effects.46 Moreover, “APHIS faces the 
difficult task under NEPA of determining the environmental effects 
of [GE] agriculture when unresolved scientific issues still exist.”47 
The confusion in Monsanto over whether deregulating RRA “would 
significantly affect the environment illustrates this difficulty.”48 
B.  Recent GE Agriculture Case Developments 
A recent example of judicial interference in ensuring compliance 
with NEPA’s procedural requirements is evident in Center for Food 
Safety v. Vilsack,49 in which the plaintiffs challenged APHIS’s 
decision to deregulate Roundup Ready sugar beets (a Monsanto 
product).50 APHIS had conducted an environmental assessment, 
concluded that the product did not have any significant 
environmental impact, and fully deregulated the GE crop.51 The 
Vilsack court found that deregulation of the Roundup Ready sugar 
beets was not supported by sufficient reasoning that it would not 
affect the environment and deemed deregulation as unreasonable 
because conventional, ordinary sugar beets could become 
contaminated.52 The Vilsack court held that “the potential elimination 
of [a] farmer’s choice to grow non-genetically engineered crops, or a 
consumer’s choice to eat non-genetically engineered food, and an 
action that potentially eliminates or reduces the availability of a 
particular plant has a significant effect on the human environment.”53 
 
 46. See Philip Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the National Environmental Policy Act: 
Substantive Law Adaptations from NEPA’s Progeny, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 207–08 
(1992) (describing NEPA as a “mere full disclosure bill,” giving federal agencies a great amount 
of discretion when implementing requirements). 
 47. Straka, supra note 34, at 390; see also Anthony J. Conner et al., The Release of 
Genetically Modified Crops into the Environment, 33 PLANT J. 19, 20 (2003), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12943539 (identifying scientific questions regarding 
effects of GE agriculture). 
 48. Straka, supra note 34, at 389; see Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 570 F.3d 1130, 1135 
(9th Cir. 2009) rev’d sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Farms Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010). 
APHIS violated NEPA because it “failed to take the required ‘hard look’ at whether and to what 
extent the unconditional deregulation of Roundup Ready alfalfa would lead to genetic 
contamination of non-genetically engineered alfalfa.” Id. 
 49. No. C-08-00484-JSW, 2009 WL 3047227 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2009). 
 50. Id. at *1–2. 
 51. Id. at *2. 
 52. See id. at *8–9. 
 53. Id. at *9. 
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Furthermore, the court stated that the plaintiff does not need to show 
that significant environmental effects will in fact occur, but if the 
plaintiff “raises substantial questions about whether a project may 
have a significant effect, an EIS must be prepared.”54 Therefore, the 
court held that APHIS had violated NEPA and ordered it to complete 
an EIS.55 
IV.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
In Monsanto the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit 
decision, agreeing that petitioners were injured because they could 
not sell RRA until APHIS completed the EIS.56 The Court provided 
an overview of the standard governing the entry of permanent 
injunctive relief involving NEPA violations. In short, the plaintiff 
must establish the following four elements: (1) that an irreparable 
injury exists; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary 
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that an 
equitable remedy is warranted considering the balance of hardships 
between the plaintiff and the defendant; and (4) that a permanent 
injunction would not disserve the public interest.57 
The Court then turned to the central question: whether the 
district court had abused its discretion when it enjoined APHIS from 
both partially deregulating RRA pending the completion of the EIS 
and prohibiting most planting of RRA.58 The Court answered this 
question in the affirmative.59 
In so holding, the Court explained that the district court’s 
injunction improperly prohibited any partial deregulation.60 If the 
district court determined that APHIS’s original complete 
deregulation of RRA was procedurally invalid, it was then for 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Because this injury could be redressed by a favorable ruling, the petitioners’ 
constitutional standing requirements were satisfied. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 
S. Ct. 2743, 2754 (2010). Similarly, respondents had standing to seek injunctive relief because 
the substantial risk of gene flow injured them by increasing their costs and requiring them to take 
steps to minimize risks of contamination. Id. at 2756. 
 57. Interestingly, the Court in eBay referred to this as the “familiar principles” of the four-
part test, despite the fact that eBay was the first opinion to establish such a test. eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 58. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2756. 
 59. Id. at 2761. 
 60. Id. at 2757–60. 
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APHIS to decide whether it would partially deregulate RRA.61 Thus, 
although the district court could decline to adopt APHIS’s proposed 
judgment—which would have authorized a partial deregulation—it 
lacked authority to enjoin a partial deregulation that had not yet 
occurred.62 
The Court concluded that injunctive relief was inappropriate 
because respondents could not show that they would suffer 
irreparable injury if APHIS proceeded with a partial deregulation.63 
First, the respondents could file a new suit challenging such an 
action.64 Second, they might not suffer any injury at all if the partial 
deregulation were sufficiently limited in scope.65 For example, 
APHIS could deregulate in a way that would eliminate all risk of 
gene flow to respondents’ crops.66 
Finally, the Court held that the district court erred in entering a 
nationwide injunction against planting RRA.67 The Court again 
emphasized the impropriety of enjoining APHIS from partially 
deregulating RRA: “If APHIS may partially deregulate RRA before 
preparing a full-blown EIS—a question that we need not and do not 
decide here—farmers should be able to grow and sell RRA in 
accordance with that agency determination.”68 Therefore, because a 
less drastic remedy—such as simply vacating APHIS’s deregulation 
decision—could redress the respondents’ injury, it was unnecessary 
to resort to the “additional and extraordinary relief of an 
injunction.”69 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court in Monsanto determined the extent of the 
burden that plaintiffs must prove to permanently enjoin an activity 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. The Court reasoned that “[u]ntil APHIS actually seeks to effect a partial deregulation, 
any judicial review of such a decision is premature.” Id. at 2758. 
 63. Id. at 2759–60. “Irreparable injury” is the first prong of the “familiar” four-part test for 
permanent injunctions, articulated in eBay. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 
(2006). 
 64. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2760. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 2761. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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that violates NEPA. By reversing the Ninth Circuit decision, 
however, the Supreme Court sent the wrong message: although there 
is scientific uncertainty surrounding the effects of GE agriculture, 
use of chemical RRA is allowed. As the dissent suggests, the Court 
did not err on the side of caution by upholding the Ninth Circuit 
injunction;70 instead, the Court indicated that it is not necessarily 
interested in respecting NEPA procedures or the ramifications for 
consumers by allowing the continued use of chemicals without 
thorough analysis. Monsanto argued that the lower courts erred in not 
requiring Geertson to show a sufficient likelihood of irreparable 
harm before permanently enjoining RRA’s further use.71 First, it 
contended that the Ninth Circuit erred in establishing a presumption 
of irreparable harm whenever someone violates NEPA’s procedural 
mandates.72 It did so by analogizing its case to “cases involving other 
environmental statutes (including the Clean Water Act and the 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act) in which the Court 
declined to create such a presumption.”73 Although, as Monsanto 
conceded, the Ninth Circuit expressly denied that it was establishing 
a presumption of irreparable harm, its argument that the Ninth 
Circuit’s approach effectively “amounts to the same thing”74 is 
unconvincing. “Given the broad sweep of the injunctive relief 
ordered, which substantially exceeded what the USDA had proposed 
in response to the court’s finding of a NEPA violation, the scope of 
the injunction goes well beyond what is needed to cure the 
procedural defect.”75 And, in any event, the case does not support 
Monsanto’s argument that “the district court erred in not conducting 
an evidentiary hearing on the likelihood of irreparable harm.”76 
Geertson made two primary arguments in response to Monsanto. 
First, Geertson argued that “although neither the district court nor the 
Ninth Circuit . . . established a presumption of irreparable harm, 
Geertson . . . in any event satisfied the likelihood-of-irreparable-harm 
 
 70. See id. at 2769–71 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 2767–69. 
 73. Josh Patashnik, Do NEPA Violations Cause Irreparable Harm?, SCOTUSBLOG, (Apr. 
27, 2009, 8:24 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/04/do-nepa-violations-cause-irreparable-
harm/. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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prong.”77 Second, Geertson argued that “the Court should not require 
district courts to hold a formal trial-type hearing on the likelihood-of-
success question, as district courts traditionally retain substantial 
leeway in determining how to conduct injunction hearings.”78 In the 
case of Monsanto, cross-pollination of GE crops could contaminate 
conventional alfalfa fields. Further, overuse of the herbicide 
Roundup, which the GE seeds were bred to resist, could harm soil 
and groundwater or even create Roundup-resistant “super weeds”—
essentially hurting the produce that consumers eat every day. Justice 
Stevens put it best when he stated that “the district court did not 
abuse its discretion when, after considering the voluminous record 
and making the aforementioned findings, it issued the order now 
before us.”79 The response is reasonable given the serious nature of 
the risks posed by RRA. Furthermore, the lower court permissibly 
exercised its equitable authority when issuing the injunction. 
A.  Use of Genetically Modified Crops 
In its amicus brief, the American Farm Bureau Federation 
faulted the district court for not considering the public interests 
served by the use of GE crops such as RRA.80 It contended that a 
farmer using RRA could produce higher-quality alfalfa and spend 
less money on expensive herbicides, and further, that the herbicide 
glyphosate is better for the environment than other herbicides.81 
However, the probability of RRA plants genetically 
contaminating conventional alfalfa is high and occurred after other 
genetically engineered species have been introduced.82 Furthermore, 
once contamination occurs, it becomes “extraordinarily difficult to 
halt, let alone reverse.”83 If irreversible contamination of 
conventional alfalfa occurs, farmers who grow organic alfalfa will 
lose their ability to participate in the organic food market because the 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Jennifer Koons, Supreme Court Lifts Ban on Planting GM Alfalfa, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 
2010, at B3. 
 80. Brief of American Farm Bureau, supra note 2, at 16. 
 81. Id. at 17. 
 82. Brief for Respondents at 36, 41–42, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 
2743 (2010) (No. 09-475). 
 83. Id. at 39. 
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organic market demands products to be 100 percent GE-free.84 This 
loss would be tremendously detrimental to these farmers and to the 
community at large, and it could hurt the significant growth in 
demand for organic products.85 
B.  Injunctive Relief in NEPA Cases 
The district court did not require Geertson to show a sufficient 
likelihood of irreparable harm, and this element should have been 
further developed and examined by the Supreme Court.86 Applying a 
low standard for permanent injunctions in these cases would impede 
important government programs, such as initiatives in the 
government’s stimulus plan that must first go through NEPA 
review.87 Furthermore, had the Supreme Court created a narrower 
remedy deferring to APHIS’s area of expertise,88 then the imposition 
of the injunction would depend on the agency, which has expertise in 
regulating GE crops, rather than the courts, which do not.89 
Furthermore, allowing judges to circumvent agency solutions would 
create a slippery slope that gives judges too much power to overrule 
federal programs with which they disagree politically. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in this case clarified the burden 
plaintiffs must meet in seeking any injunction, not only ones 
pertaining to NEPA violations. By overturning the Ninth Circuit 
decision, the Court sent a message: when faced with scientific 
uncertainty, one must forge ahead when making a decision to 
deregulate rather than issue an injunction.90 If the Court permits a 
standard that allows deregulation before an environmental 
assessment has been filed, the court does not evaluate all the possible 
harms of deregulation.91 
 
 84. Id. at 40. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al. 
in Support of Petitioners at 25, Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (No. 09-475). 
 87. See id. at 23–24. 
 88. See id. at 27. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. at 28–29 (“[I]nstead of giving any deference to the expert agency and its 
scientific findings, the district court gave APHIS’s view no weight at all. The Ninth Circuit then 
compounded that error by deferring to the district court and not APHIS.”). 
 91. Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2771 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It was reasonable for the 
[district] court to conclude that planting could not go forward until more complete study, 
presented in an EIS, showed that the known problem of gene flow could, in reality, be 
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C.  What Is the Appropriate Standard for Granting Injunctive Relief? 
Monsanto argued that the lower courts inappropriately issued an 
injunction by mistakenly applying a special rule for injunctive relief 
in NEPA-violation cases.92 In so arguing, Monsanto showed the 
lower courts erred when they simply used a procedural violation of 
NEPA as a proxy for the finding that irreparable injury was likely to 
occur if they did not issue the injunction sought.93 Rather, lower 
courts were required to make a separate, independent finding of 
likely irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction.94 
The Court articulated the four-part equitable test for injunctive 
relief, which was initially presented in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
LLC.95 The problem, according to Monsanto, is that neither the lower 
court nor the Ninth Circuit actually judged whether irreversible harm 
was likely to occur or whether such harm could be prevented through 
a more narrowly tailored injunction.96 Rather, the district court 
simply “based its injunction on the possibility of two harms it 
believed could flow from the use of RRA . . . .”97 Monsanto then 
argued that there is no likelihood that RRA would eliminate 
conventional alfalfa (relying on a string of scientific testing).98 
Further, if the courts adopted the proposed narrowly tailored 
injunction—rather than a blanket injunction—the stewardship 
measures outlined in the proposal would significantly reduce any risk 
of cross-pollination between RRA and regular alfalfa.99 Moreover, 
even if there were individual cases of cross-pollination, such isolated 
incidents could not constitute irreparable environmental harm for the 
purposes of injunctive relief.100 
 
prevented.”). 
 92. Brief for Petitioners at 25–26, Monsanto Co., 130 S. Ct. 2743 (No. 09-475). 
 93. Id. at 27. 
 94. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 375 (2008). 
 95. 547 U.S. 388 (2006); see Brief for Petitioners, supra note 92, at 25 (laying out the four-
part test). 
 96. Id. at 28–29. 
 97. Id. at 33. 
 98. Id. at 34–37. 
 99. Id. at 35–47. 
 100. Id. at 35 (“The remote possibility of sporadic cross-pollination of conventional crops 
with neighboring RRA, however unwanted by the conventional or organic farmer, is not a 
cognizable environmental harm under NEPA and therefore not an appropriate cause for an 
injunction to remedy a NEPA violation.”). 
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However, the district court did, in fact, make a finding of likely 
irreparable harm, and its decision to issue the injunction was an 
appropriate exercise of judgment.101 It sufficiently established 
instances of genetic contamination between regular alfalfa and RRA, 
which was enough to show that such occurrences were likely to 
continue, absent a blanket injunction.102 
In eBay, the Court articulated the “familiar” four-part test with 
the fourth prong stating that granting the injunction does not disserve 
the public interest.103 Before implementing this test, it had always 
been the case that courts, when balancing equitable harms, weighed 
the public interest.104 Monsanto reinforced eBay’s principle that the 
burden rests with the plaintiff to show that the public interest would 
not be disserved if the court issued an injunction.105 In Monsanto, the 
Court, although troubled by specific components of the injunction,106 
moved forward with the eBay test and appeared oblivious to any 
difference between permanent and preliminary injunctions.107 In the 
traditional four-part test for preliminary injunctions, one element is 
probability of success on the merits,108 which makes no sense if 
applied to permanent injunctions because they are issued after the 
merits of the case have been successfully established.109 
Additionally, Monsanto reinforces that the familiar four-part test 
 
 101. Brief for Respondents, supra note 82, at 35. 
 102. Id. at 36. 
 103. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006). There has never 
been a “traditional” four-part test. Remedies specialists have never even heard of the four-part 
test. Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. 
MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63, 76 n.71 (2007). 
 104. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring); MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 
401 F.3d 1323, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Forest Conservation 
Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Lands Council v. 
McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he public interest in preserving nature and 
avoiding irreparable injury outweighs economic concerns in cases where plaintiffs were likely to 
succeed on the merits of their underlying claim . . . .”). 
 105. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2756 (2010) (following eBay in 
that “the plaintiff must satisfy the four-factor test before a court may grant an injunction”). 
 106. Id. at 2758 (“Until APHIS actually seeks to effect a partial deregulation, any judicial 
review of such a decision is premature.”). 
 107. Preliminary injunctions are issued before a final decision on the merits, an important 
distinction. The court in eBay had initially cited Romero-Barcelo and Amoco. Amoco was a 
preliminary injunction case, not a permanent injunction case. Similarly, the proposed injunction 
in Romero-Barcelo reads as though the injunction was only preliminary. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, 
MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 426 (4th ed. 2010). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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does not apply only to patent cases, as some courts had argued until 
this case.110 Furthermore, not only have the federal courts never 
offered the test before but now lower courts are struggling to apply it 
and to explain the difference between the irreparable-injury and 
inadequacy-of-damages prongs.111 
VI.  IMPLICATIONS 
A.  Effects of Deregulation 
On January 27, 2011, the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) decided to fully deregulate Monsanto’s genetically 
engineered crops—a choice favored by large biotech companies.112 
This step was taken after an extensive inquiry into the effects of 
RRA deregulation, a draft EIS that listed preliminary conclusions, 
and a public comment period, which was met with such an 
overwhelming response that the APHIS decided to extend the public 
comment period. The USDA had the option to maintain “regulatory 
status” over RRA, an incredibly important crop for the livestock 
industry, or the option to limit the deregulation with “bans on the 
planting of GE alfalfa seeds in seed growing regions to attempt to 
limit the contamination of alfalfa seed stock by foreign DNA from 
Monsanto’s crop.”113 Instead, although receiving over 250,000 public 
comments, with the majority opposing deregulation, the agency 
decided to completely deregulate under extensive pressure from the 
biotech sector.114 One positive result is the announcement that the 
USDA would “establish a second germ plasm/seed center for alfalfa 
in the state of Idaho to try and maintain GE-free strains of alfalfa.”115 
Even so, full deregulation to the extent allowed by the USDA will 
have severe consequences on both the farming industry and the 
environment. 
Monsanto has far broader implications beyond GE alfalfa. For 
 
 110. Id. at 427. 
 111. See id. (explaining that before eBay, courts presumed irreparable injury in intellectual 
property cases, but that courts are now split on whether any such presumption is permissible). 
 112. USDA to Fully Deregulate Monsanto’s Genetically Engineer Alfalfa—Gene 
Contamination of Feed, Milk, Meat and Other Products to Follow . . ., CORNUCOPIA INST. (Jan. 
27, 2011), http://www.cornucopia.org/2011/01/breaking-news. 
 113. Id. Alfalfa is typically pollinated by bees and “has a pollination radius of five miles.” Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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one, “it illustrates the growing trend of genetic modification in 
agriculture, the unanswered questions surrounding its environmental 
effects, and the insufficiency of APHIS’s decision-making under 
existing laws.”116 Deregulation can lead to the contamination of pure 
strains of alfalfa, a complaint described by the owner of Geertson 
Seed Farms.117 It is critical to keep strains of alfalfa pure from cross-
pollination to ensure the health of those consuming organic products. 
If the distinction between pure and GE alfalfa is blurred, the farming 
industry, more specifically small, family-owned farms, will 
encounter great obstacles in distinguishing between GE and pure 
varieties of their crop. 
Deregulation also has a negative impact on the amount of GE 
ingredients in our local supermarkets, which is “growing at an 
increasingly alarming rate.”118 More concerning is that government 
agencies such as the USDA, through Monsanto, have decided to 
overlook GE crops’ ramifications, and even worse have “allow[ed] 
them to be sold without any labeling whatsoever.”119 The American 
consumer has been “left largely in the dark, unable to make informed 
choices about buying foods containing [GE ingredients].”120 Given 
the mind-boggling figures—by some estimates over 75 percent of all 
processed foods sold in the United States contain a genetically 
modified ingredient—corn, soy, sugar, beef, and dairy products are 
among the most likely to have been genetically modified.121  Next, 
given the difficulty in finding and growing GE-free crops, the prices 
of organic goods could rise, particularly in stores specializing in GE-
free organic foods such as Trader Joe’s.122 Additionally, “U.S. alfalfa 
 
 116. Straka, supra note 34, at 389; see also Is USDA Accounting for Costs to Farmers Caused 
by Contamination from Genetically Engineered Plants?: Hearing Before the Domestic Policy 
Subcomm., 110th Cong. 4–5 (2008) (opening statement of Congressman Dennis J. Kucinich, 
Chairman, Domestic Policy Subcomm., Oversight and Government Reform Comm.). 
 117. “Once RRA is in the environment . . . alfalfa as we know it will be gone forever.” 
KRISTINA HUBBARD, W. ORG. OF RES. COUNCILS, A GUIDE TO GENETICALLY MODIFIED 
ALFALFA (2008), available at http://www.worc.org/userfiles/file/Guide_%20to_%20GM_ 
%20Alfafa_%20v2.pdf (noting significance of Geertson Seed Farms in agricultural litigation). 
 118. Josh Corn, Why You Should Be Concerned About GMOs, LIVE NOW (Feb. 20, 2011), 
http://www.stopagingnow.com/liveinthenow/article/are-gmo-foods-bad-for-you-why-you-should-
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 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Straka, supra note 34, at 402; see also Trader Joe’s Frequently Asked Questions, 
TRADER JOE’S, http://www.traderjoes.com/about/product-faq.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
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exports to foreign countries could also be adversely affected as many 
countries require [GE-free] feed.”123 
Furthermore, deregulation may lead to increased herbicide 
use.124 “Since the introduction of Roundup Ready crops in the United 
States, herbicide use has increased by 60,000 tons.”125 This increased 
use of herbicides “increases the risk of subsequent environmental 
effects, such as the development of herbicide-resistant weeds.”126 The 
“popularity of [GE] agriculture will only persist as large corporations 
like Monsanto continue to develop new [GE] products, such as [GE] 
milk and [GE] sugar beets,”127 which are cash cows for Monsanto 
and other large agricultural corporations.128 Seeds are genetically 
modified through genes or viruses that are “spliced into their DNA,” 
so that they can withstand the heavy amounts of pesticides that are 
typically sprayed on them.129  What is more alarming is that, to date, 
“there have been no long-term human safety studies conducted on 
genetically modified [crops].”130 Furthermore, it is inconceivable to 
assume that GE crops are nontoxic and benign to the consumer, as 
not enough research or testing has been conducted to determine the 
effect of their potency on human health.131 
Furthermore, the American Academy of Environmental 
Medicine’s (the “Academy”) position on GE crops is that they “have 
not been properly tested and pose a serious health risk,” and that 
production of GE foods should be halted until long-term studies 
demonstrate their safety.132 According to the Academy, “[a]nimal 
studies indicate serious health risks associated with GE crops,” 
including reproductive problems, compromised immunity, 
 
 123. Straka, supra note 34, at 402. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 402–03. 
 126. Id. at 403 (citing DONNA U. VOGT & MICKEY PARISH, CONG. RESEARCH SERVS., FOOD 
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products under development by Monsanto). 
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accelerated aging, blood sugar imbalances, and harm to major 
organs.133 Many other local and national environmental, public 
health, and consumer protection organizations are also calling for 
these initiatives to be taken and for Monsanto’s destructive ways to 
be stopped.134 
Despite GE agriculture’s wide usage, GE products are regulated 
under APHIS, an agency that was “created at a time when [GE] 
products had not yet been conceived.”135 As a result, the current 
regulations governing GE agriculture do not properly handle the 
issues that GE crops pose. Courts have expressed an eagerness to 
enforce compliance with NEPA’s regulatory standards: the 
“continued issuance of injunctions on a case-by-case basis for each 
new GE product may become costly and inefficient as GE agriculture 
and its accompanying regulatory problems grow.”136 
Furthermore, courts are not equipped to make decisions about 
the safety of GE products for two reasons. First, they lack the 
necessary scientific knowledge to make findings about the safety of 
these products.137 And second, there is insufficient research to 
provide to courts when making decisions about GE food safety. 
Therefore, instead of depending on courts to make the scientific 
conclusions, the USDA should design a “new regulatory system to 
rectify inadequacies in the current system.”138 Given the significant 
increase in GE foods, legislatures must develop new laws 
specifically geared to the regulation of GE agriculture and the 
“division of regulatory authority over [GE] agriculture must shift 
from APHIS to an agency with the scientific knowledge, experience, 
and resources to properly assess the environmental effects of this 
technology.”139 
B.  Injunctive Relief 
Most troubling are Monsanto’s ramifications with regard to the 
public-interest prong of the eBay test and the lack of a class-action 
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certification. The Court said that the case was not a class action; thus, 
plaintiffs could not rely on harm to parties not before the Court. 
“Although the Court emphasized its new four-part test, it appeared to 
treat as irrelevant the possibility that harm to alfalfa-seed farmers 
who were not plaintiffs [in this case might constitute] harm to the 
public interest.”140 As Justice Stevens noted, the plaintiffs included 
organizations of farmers, consumers, and environmentalists.141 
Because organizations can represent their members without a class 
certification, harm to any member of one of these organizations is 
equivalent to harm to one of the parties.142 However, the Court seems 
to have a narrow definition of how a plaintiff can prove that an 
injunction does not disserve the public interest. 
Interestingly, in eBay, the Court phrases the public-interest test 
as requiring the plaintiff to show that the public interest is not 
disserved by granting the injunction.143 Was the phrasing deliberate, 
or inadvertent? Does this mean that benefits to the public interest 
cannot count in favor of issuing the injunction? May a plaintiff show 
that an injunction could be in the public interest, not disserved by it? 
Essentially, the Court has molded the public-interest prong to work 
in one direction. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Monsanto has opened the door to deregulation of genetically 
engineered agriculture in a manner that, unfortunately, is harmful to 
both the environment and to the public. Furthermore, by making 
injunctive relief more difficult to obtain, the public and small groups 
are unable to band together to stop the movement toward 
deregulation. Unfortunately, the Monsanto decision takes a step in 
the wrong direction for a more environmentally friendly food 
product and for injunctive relief actions. 
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